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ARTICLE
Roads and Barriers towards Social Investments: Comparing
Labour Market and Family Policy Reforms in Europe and East
Asia
Timo Fleckensteina and Soohyun Christine Leeb
aDepartment of Social Policy, London School of Economics, London, UK; bDepartment of European and
International Studies, King’s College London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Across the OECD world, social investment policies are on the rise,
which Hemerijck describes as a ‘quiet paradigm revolution’. Whilst
Nordic countries are typically considered the pioneers in social
investment policies, we observe that latecomer countries of not
only Europe but also East Asia have made considerable efforts to
catch-up with Northern European frontrunners. The rise of social
investment policies, especially the expansion of family policy pre-
sents an important dimension of the recent transformation of
advanced welfare capitalism, which despite the prominence of
retrenchment cannot be reduced to welfare state regress.
However, we observe great cross-national variation in the speed
and scope of family policy expansion. Unlike family policy, labour
market policy did not experience a similar social investment turn,
but is instead rather characterised by retrenchment with declining
efforts to improve the employability of the unemployed and labour
market outsiders. In this article, we examine the ‘uneven’ social
investment turn in advanced welfare capitalism and argue that
family and labour market policies, and their very different out-
comes, are underpinned by very different political dynamics, rather
than by ‘a politics of social investment’. Not only comparing family
and labour market policy but also comparing across countries
within each policy domain, we analyse the roads and barriers
towards greater social investments.
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Social policy; social
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Across the OECD world, social investment policies are on the rise, which Hemerijck
(2015) describes as a ‘quiet paradigm revolution’. Whilst Nordic countries are typically
considered the pioneers in social investment policies, we observe that latecomer coun-
tries of not only Europe but also East Asia have made considerable efforts to catch-up
with Northern European frontrunners. The rise of social investment policies, especially
the expansion of family policy presents an important dimension of the recent transfor-
mation of advanced welfare capitalism, which despite the prominence of retrenchment
cannot be reduced to welfare state regress. However, we observe great cross-national
variation in the speed and scope of family policy expansion. Unlike family policy, labour
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market policy did not experience a similar social investment turn, but it is instead rather
characterised by retrenchment with declining efforts to improve the employability of the
unemployed and labour market outsiders.
What are the political dynamics driving social investment policies? Not only compar-
ing family and labour market policy but also comparing across countries within each
policy domain, we find considerable variation in policy development, which allows us to
analyse the roads and barriers towards greater social investments. And by including
‘deviant’ cases (i.e. cases that do not comply with the general trend in each of the policy
domains), we are in a position to better capture the complexity of the political drivers in
family and labour market policy reform. Rather than suggesting ‘a politics of social
investment’, we argue that family and labour market policies and their very different
outcomes are underpinned by very different political dynamics. In family policy, the
social investment turn in Germany and South Korea will be investigated and compared
against the ‘deviant’ Japanese experience, where an ‘early’ social investment turn came to
a ‘standstill’ and family policy returned to more traditional family support policies
(namely, the expansion of child benefits). We show the critical importance of electoral
competition in Germany and Korea, where political parties on the left and right ‘mod-
ernised’ their family policy portfolios in order to attract young voters and young women
voters in particular. In the German case, we also find employer support for employment-
oriented family policy reforms suggesting the emergence of a new cross-class coalition,
whereas business remained critical in Korea. By contrast, electoral competition did not
fuel family policy modernisation in Japan. Instead, the persistence of conservative value
orientation in the Japanese electorate (including young people) facilitated the returning
to general family support policies by both the political right and left.
In labour market policy, we find that Sweden departed from its ‘social-democratic’
trajectory after the economic crisis in the early 1990s. Whilst retrenchment in unemploy-
ment protection and a decline in training driven by the political right might not come with
much surprise, it is puzzling that social democracy pursued very similar policies after the
economic crisis.Here, business breakingwith the post-war, cross-class compromise appears
critical, with huge impact on social-democratic policy-makers and their perception of the
feasibility of the Swedishmodel. Likewise, neoliberal businessmobilisation in Germany and
the associated political confrontation are key to understanding the failed ‘social-democratic’
turn in labourmarket policywhen social democracy re-entered government office in the late
1990s. As in Sweden, we observe the programmatic differences between the political left and
right diminishing in labour market policy, which translated into far-reaching workfare
activation in the 2000s. By contrast, Italy offers innovation in labour market policy. Not
unlike Sweden and Germany, the country has experienced significant deregulation at the
margins of the labour market, which has driven a huge increase in atypical employment,
especially temporary agency work. Responding to this dualisation, organised labour has
successfully campaigned for investing in the skills of temporary agency workers – i.e. Italy
presents a ‘deviant’ case of investing in labourmarket policy. However, instead of relying on
the state, unions, in the industrial relations arena, have managed the establishment of
a training fund jointly run with employers, which provides temporary agency workers
with exemplary access to training by European standards.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: We start with developing the link
between social investment and the activation discourse in the welfare state reform debate.
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It is distinguished between enabling and workfare activation, with the former corre-
sponding with the social investment paradigm. Investigating the ‘uneven’ social invest-
ment turn in the two policy domains, we first analyse the politics of investing in families,
before turning towards labour market policy and the politics of investing in labour
market outsiders. With our wide selection of countries, we provide insights into social
investment policies in different welfare regime contexts. Whilst Sweden is considered the
archetypical case for social democratic welfare, Germany presents the prime example for
conservative-corporatist regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990); and Italy, a variant of con-
servative welfare, represents the Southern European model of welfare, work and the
family (Ferrera, 1996). Japan and South Korea are commonly considered productivist or
developmental welfare states, with the former widely seen as the prototypical develop-
mental welfare state but the latter presenting productivism in ‘purer’ form (Holliday,
2000; Ringen, Kwon, Yi, Kim, & Lee, 2011).
Social investment and activation: the ‘uneven’ social investment turn
Post-war welfare states of the Golden Age with their focus on social protection have faced
increased criticism that they are ill-equipped to cope with the more complex challenges of
post-industrial societies and the associated rise of new social risks (such as work-family
reconciliation and lowor obsolete skills). In both academic andpolitical debates, the argument
on overcoming the passivity of welfare states gained momentum from the mid-1990s.
‘Passivity’ refers to the observation that the welfare state was primarily ascribed the respon-
sibility of providing benefits in the event of income loss (e.g. unemployment and old-age),
whilst efforts and incentives to encourage participation in employment and to facilitate the
reintegration into the labour market were by and large underdeveloped. This criticism of the
‘activation discourse’ was in particular targeted at labour market policy but also family policy
where governments (with some notable exceptions, such as Nordic countries) made little
efforts to support work/family reconciliation (Clasen, 2000; Cox, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2004).
Analytically, one can distinguish two ideal-typical variants of activation, based upon
two different problem analyses and objectives: “activation policies may be regarded as
‘compassionate’ (tackling social exclusion) or as ‘condemning’ (tackling anti-social
behaviour); as empowering or as forms of social control” (Clasen, 2000, p. 91). The
objective of tackling anti-social behaviour (such as the lack of readiness to accept
reasonable work) is associated with calls for negative work incentives; that is increased
pressure and obligations on the unemployed (such as reduced generosity and duration of
benefits as well as tightened criteria of benefit eligibility, job search and reasonable work).
Non-compliance is sanctioned with the reduction, suspension or loss of benefit entitle-
ments. Activation through workfare (also described as coercive activation) is charac-
terised by enforced labour market integration through increased compulsion, including
‘making work pay’ measures (that is, subsidising low incomes with models combining
labour income and public transfer to establish a more ‘employment-friendly’ welfare
state). By contrast, the emancipatory scenario of activation can be described as an
attempt of social investment. Still geared toward the recommodification of labour, social
investments in the unemployed, for instance, seeks to improve the human capital and
employability of unemployed persons through measures of active labour market policy,
most notably training measures. Hence, the ‘umbrella term’ of activation is ideal-typically
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differentiated between a positive (empowering or enabling) and a negative (coercive or
workfare) variant. In the domain of family policy, childcare and parental leave policies
present an investment in parents (and especially mothers) by helping with the reconcilia-
tion of work and family. Instead of improving the human capital, these policies improve
labour market flow; so these policies might be thought as improving skills retention
rather than the promotion of their formation. However, childcare provision, as early
childhood education and care policy, also promotes the development of young children,
which can be viewed as an investment into their human capital (see also Dingeldey, 2007;
Fleckenstein, Saunders, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011; Taylor-Gooby, 2004).
We see that social investment policies can be considered as being intimately linked with
the enabling activation discourse, and they are typically regarded as carrying considerable
societal benefits. With their firm focus on skills, social investment policies are meant to
sustain the knowledge economy with its ever higher skills requirements. They help with
making workforces more adaptable and able to respond to fast-changing economies, in
which knowledge is widely seen as the key driver for productivity and economic growth.
Thus, social policies that help with improving human capital (‘stock’) but also help with
making better use of human capital (‘flow’) cannot be reduced to the consumptive function
that is typically associated with social protection but present an important ‘productive
factor’ in modern economies (Hemerijck, 2017; Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012).
Looking at recent welfare reforms across the OECD world, we find that labour market
policy primarily pursues a trajectory of workfare activation. Labour market reform is
dominated by retrenchment in unemployment protection with reducing benefit levels,
shortening benefit duration and tightening eligibility criteria. Also, when not complying
with the expectations, the unemployed are typically exposed to a stricter sanction regime. At
the same time, ‘costly’ up-skilling has lost importance in labour market policy, where cost
containment has become a major reform rationale privileging negative incentive reinforce-
ment in reforms across the different worlds of welfare (Bengtsson, de la Porte, & Jacobsson,
2017; Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017b). By contrast, ‘employment-oriented’ family policy reform
expanding childcare provision and improving parental leave policies follows the logic of
enabling activation, as reforms are thought to help working parents with reconciling work
and family more easily. Also, early childhood education and care policies display a strong
social investment rationale (Boling, 2015; Fleckenstein & Lee, 2014; Morgan, 2013).
But what explains the ‘uneven’ social investment turn in labour market and family
policy? In light of skills shortages, one might argue that there is a very convincing case for
investing in training as well, and a recent review of more than 200 labour market
programme evaluations supports training as an effective social investment policy.
Whilst active labour market programmes do not appear to make much immediate
difference, they produce more favourable results about two to three years after comple-
tion; and this applies in particular to training programmes (Card, Kluve, &Weber, 2018).
The politics of investing in families
In the following section, we investigate the roads and barriers to social investment
policies by first analysing the politics of employment-oriented family policy expansion
in Germany and South Korea, followed by the exploration of barriers that made Japan
return to traditional family policy after some ‘experimenting’ with progressive policy.
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Germany: departing from the conservative path of family policy
Historically, complying with male breadwinner ideology, (West) German family policy
was geared toward supporting the family unit with generous subsidies through the tax
system (most notably, the joint taxation of married couples) and child benefits. These
‘general family support’ policies were meant to facilitate a traditional, gendered division
of paid and unpaid work by ensuring enough family income, so that female employment
was not needed to support the family (Korpi, 2000; Ostner & Lewis, 1995). Modest
childcare expansion for the over-3s after German unification, providing legal entitlement
to part-time care only modified the predominant male breadwinner model (Ostner,
1998). When a centre-left government of social democrats and green party (1998–2005)
entered office in the late 1990s, perceived wisdom from the Swedish experience of
employment-oriented family policy expansion under social-democratic leadership com-
bined with feminist agency (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Mahon, 1997) would suggest
policies challenging the gendered division of labour by promoting progressive parental
leave and childcare policies in particular. Instead, social democracy prioritised general
family support when raising child benefits, whereas childcare expansion was not even on
the political agenda. The ‘Christian-democratic’, flat-rate parental leave scheme promot-
ing traditional caregiving was made somewhat more flexible to promote part-time work
but ‘Swedish-style’ parental leave was not on the agenda either. However, a right to part-
time work for parents was introduced. More ambitious interventions into the workplace
failed because of fierce opposition from business, which enjoyed support from the social-
democratic chancellor who showed little if not no interest in the work of his family
minister (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004; Leitner, Ostner, & Schmitt, 2008).
The status of family policy changed notably in the run-up to the 2002 election. Under
considerable electoral pressure, the chancellor was persuaded that family policy not only had
mobilising capacity among young voters (where social-democratic support was considered
fragile) but also that family policy investments had an important economic rationale in the
modernisation of Germany’s social welfare system. Despite some earlier reservations in the
wider social-democratic leadership, the previously ‘sceptical’ chancellor, who also chaired the
party, raised the profile of family policy, and committed the party to childcare expansion in
the 2002 election manifesto. After the election, the commitment to childcare expansion was
reiterated in the Agenda 2010, which was thought to shape the re-elected government’s social
policy programme. Savings from the integration of unemployment and social assistance (see
below) would provide the funding needed for childcare expansion. However, the govern-
ment’s key agenda of ‘modernising’ unemployment protection undermined the chancellor’s
authority within the party; and this made him call a snap election. Expanding the family
policy modernisation agenda, the 2005 election manifesto committed the party to ‘Swedish-
style’ parental leave. The political ‘gamble’ of the snap election, however, did not pay off; and
the social democracy, without their chancellor, became junior partner in a grand coalition
with Christian democracy (Fleckenstein, 2011b; Lee andMohun Himmelweit Forthcoming).
In the grand coalition (2005–2009), Christian democracy secured the family ministry.
Conventional wisdom would have expected family policy modernisation to come to
a standstill, as Christian democracy was strongly associated with traditional family and
gender values. However, almost parallel to family policymodernisation in social democracy,
Christian democracy after its 1998 election defeat, driven by the then secretary general and
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later party leader and chancellor,modernised, outside the eyes of the public andmuch of the
party, its approach to the family and gender with explicit consideration of the electoral
fortune of the party. Based on the analysis of voting behaviour in the 1998 election, the
prospect of returning into government office was considered poor without greater appeal to
young women voters in particular. This agenda was further facilitated by the unexpected
2002 election defeat, which reinforced the perception of an electoral imperative to moder-
nise the party. Building on the new Christian-democratic chancellor’s modernisation
project, the new family minister not only continued with the expansion of childcare
provision but also introduced a ‘Swedish-style’ parental leave scheme including ‘daddy
months’, as earlier proposed by social democracy. She experienced considerable resistance
among the conservativewing of Christian democracy and some parts of the Catholic church
(Fleckenstein, 2011b), but skilful cross-class coalition building including themobilisation of
employers’ associations allowed the overcoming of intra-party opposition (Fleckenstein &
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011).
South Korea: departing from the Confucian path of family policy
South Korea has also been defined as strong male breadwinner country. Similar to
conservative Catholic thinking in Europe, East Asian Confucian ideology not only
places great weight on the family in welfare provision, but also views women as primary
caregiver (Jones, 1993; Sung & Pascall, 2014). While there were no generous family/child
benefits, key features in the labour market (such as the lifetime employment practice,
generous enterprise welfare and seniority wages) underpinned the protection of male
breadwinners (Rosenbluth & Thies, 2010). Conservative gender roles and the gendered
division of paid and unpaid work went hand in hand with the developmental welfare
strategy of the East Asian states. In order to maximise investment in economic develop-
ment, it was critical for women to perform the role of unpaid caregivers (Lee, 2018).
Accordingly, public policies promoting work/family reconciliation were rudimentary at
best in the region (Sung & Pascall, 2014). In Korea, maternity leave was paid but short,
and only mothers were entitled to unpaid parental leave. Childcare was regarded as
a private matter, and only some very limited public childcare support was provided to
low-income families in order to prevent child poverty. The first notable expansion of
employment-oriented family policy, in line with power resources theory, came with the
rise of the centre-left in Korean politics. Despite the weakness (though not absence) of
feminists in Korea, during the ten years of centre-left governments (1998–2008), work/
family reconciliation policy gained political salience, and it was particularly the second
centre-left government that implemented bolder reforms. For the first time, childcare
support was made available for middle-income families, in addition to ambitious pledges
to increase public provision of childcare. Parental leave became much more generous in
terms of both benefit level and duration, although the benefit level remained modest by
international standards (An & Peng, 2016; Lee, 2018).
At the same time, the somewhat unexpected second election victory of the centre-left,
which greatly relied on the support from young voters that were deliberately targeted
with ‘progressive’ family policies, provided an eye-opening moment for the conservative
party, which had previously been most committed to Confucian family and gender ideals.
Conservatives acknowledged the critical importance of winning young voters to reverse
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their electoral fortune; and in the 2007 presidential election campaign, the party made
a U-turn in family policy, promising policy reform as ambitious as the centre-left party’s
pledges, driven by the perception that family policy was instrumental in increasing
electoral appeal to young voters. Under the two conservative governments (2008–2017),
family policy continued to expand, achieving free universal childcare for all, and parental
leave benefit improved too. The flat-rate leave benefit turned into an earnings-related one
with an income replacement rate of 40%, effectively doubling the maximum amount of
benefit. In addition to progressive employment-oriented family policy measures, by
which the conservatives demonstrated sustained effort to modernise the party and
increase electoral appeal among young voters, they also introduced a home-care allow-
ance, a general family support policy, to maintain appeal to their traditional support base
(Lee, 2018). As the two main parties began to compete over young voters on family
policy, and successfully presented family policy as pro-natal policies to address the low-
fertility ‘crisis’, family policy received broad political support. Yet, organised business had
initially opposed family policy reform most strongly. Employers, displaying rather liberal
social policy preferences, objected to greater welfare spending, and also they saw little
economic and human capital benefits in the reform. With family policy gaining political
salience, however, they eventually, on purely strategic grounds, consented to childcare
expansion funded through general taxation to prevent a greater direct financial burden
on business (Fleckenstein & Lee, 2014, 2017a).
Japan: from pioneering employment-oriented family policy to returning to
traditionalism
Japan, along with Korea and other East Asian countries, has been a strong male bread-
winner country. Public measures to support mothers’ employment were meagre, as social
norms expected women to quit their job in good time before childbirth. However, in the
1990s, Japan pioneered employment-oriented family policy in East Asia, when, for the first
time, centre-left forces were in power. Breaking with nearly four decades of unchallenged
dominance by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Japanese left,
prompted by the so-called ‘1.57 fertility shock’, was the key driver of the so-called Angel
Plan (1994–1999), promising a substantial increase of childcare provision. This lends
additional support for power resources theory in the East Asian context, although, as
with the Korean case, Japanese feminists were too weak to play a meaningful role in the first
expansion of work/family reconciliation policy (Schoppa, 2006).
Nevertheless, unlike the Korean case, the rise of employment-oriented policy in Japan
was short-lived. The subsequent conservative coalition government of LDP and Komeito
(1998–2009) continued, at first, with the childcare expansion of the centre-left by launching
the so-called New Angel Plan (2000–2004). The two Angel Plans resulted in the doubling of
the enrolment rate of children under the age three (from 10.1% in 1995 to 24% in 2010), but
they did not overcome the chronic shortages of childcare places across different ages; and
Japanese parents continued to rely greatly on unlicensed, private childcare providers (so-
called ‘baby hotels’). Rather than employment-oriented policy, the LDP-Komeito coalition
government prioritised general family support policy when attention shifted to the expan-
sion of child benefits, both in terms of eligibility and generosity. The conservative public
opinion in Japan, according to which childcare was still regarded as the responsibility of the
POLICY AND SOCIETY 7
family and not the state, provided the conservative forces with little incentive to modernise
their stance in family policy beyond their initial concerns about low fertility. Social
conservatism, not only in the wider society but also among young voters, was much
more pronounced in Japan than in Korea. Despite having the same Confucian legacy in
the society, the Korean public is much more supportive of state intervention in childcare
than their Japanese counterparts (Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017a).
Given the strong social conservatism, it might not have come with much surprise that the
centre-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) continued with the expansion of child benefits
rather than childcare when the left was back in power (2009–2012). The DPJ jumped on the
child benefit ‘bandwagon’, a conservative initiative, to underline its support for ‘the family’.
This demonstrates how the conservative appetite of the electorate shaped party competition in
family policy with a strong focus on general family support rather than on employment
support. Thus, despite its legacy as a pioneer of ‘progressive’ family policy in East Asia, in the
absence of an electoral rationale for progressive policies, Japan shifted its focus in family policy
to more ‘traditional’ measures. As with the low-fertility crisis in Korea, the ‘fertility shock’ in
Japan provided an important justification for family policy expansion, at first childcare
expansion and later the improvement of financial support for families. It is intriguing,
however, that policy experts in the Japanese ministerial bureaucracy consider the expansion
of child benefits an inadequate measures for raising ultra-low fertility in Japan (Boling, 2015).
Regardless of this assessment, Japanese partisan policy-makers shifted their attention from
childcare to child benefit expansion – underlining the electoral rationale in the face of strong
social conservatism (Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017a).
To conclude the study of family policies, it appears that left-party rule and feminist agency
that drove the expansion of progressive policies in Nordic countries (see for the power
resources model including its feminist variant: Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983;
Mahon, 1997) fails to explain the expansion of employment-oriented family policy in
latecomer countries. Admittedly, left parties in all three countries brought these policies
onto the political agenda, but they failed to develop political momentum. In Germany and
Korea, one might want to describe the political left as ‘half-hearted’, especially if compared to
the policy expansion by their right-wing successors; and in Japan, the left even turned away
from childcare expansion and returned to conservative general family support policies with
the expansion of child benefits. In Germany and Korea, where the political right continued
with ‘social-democratic’ family policy expansion, we identified electoral competition for
young and women voters as a critical rationale, which allowed the overcoming of the very
traditional family and gender models that were long unchallenged on the political right. In
Japan, corresponding with the electoral competition argument derived from the German and
Korean cases, the persistence of traditional gender views across the Japanese society, including
young and women voters, did not provide a sustainable, electoral incentive structure for the
modernisation of the political right, and the left gave up on family policymodernisation.With
regard to cross-class coalitions, the German case corresponds with the earlier Swedish
experience, where employer support provided a broad societal base for employment-
oriented family policies (Swenson, 2002). However, the Korean case, with rather hostile
business, suggests that employer support is not a necessary condition for a comprehensive
family policy agenda. Rather, party-political agency, as vote and office-seekers (Strøm, 1990),
claims the ‘driving seat’ in family policy – its modernisation as in the German and Korean
cases, but also the return to traditional policies as the Japanese case illustrates.
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The politics of investing in labour market outsiders
Unlike the ‘empowering’ we can observe in family policy with the expansion of work/
family reconciliation policies facilitating women’s employment participation in particu-
lar, labour market reform has been dominated by retrenchment that can be thought as an
expression of ‘condemning’, with coercive activation pushing the unemployed into
accepting any job rather than training efforts ‘investing’ in their employability to increase
their chances for ‘good jobs’. Apparently, positive electoral competition driving up
enabling activation in family policy has not been at work in labour market reform.
Sweden: departing from social-democratic activation and turning towards
workfare
Sweden is not only associated with generous unemployment protection but also widely
considered the ‘pioneer’ in active labour market policy, including extensive training
programmes. Whilst social democracy and the labour movement are typically viewed
as the key architect of Nordic welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1983),
skilled labour shortages in post-war Sweden have been argued to have provided the
socio-political foundations for employers to support comprehensive social welfare provi-
sion, not only training programmes geared towards to improving employability of the
unemployed but also generous unemployment protection to promote industry-specific
skills formation. This suggests that Swedish labour market policy rested upon a broader,
cross-class coalition (Swenson, 2002).
In the economic difficulties of the early 1990s, to cope with the massive increase in
unemployment rate (from 1.5% to almost 10%), Sweden first responded in the expected
manner by making great use of active labour market policy measures, including sub-
stantial training efforts. Spending on training reached 1.0% of GDP, and active labour
market policy more broadly peaked at 2.8% of GDP. However, the economic crisis and
the associated immense pressure on public finances paved the way for a gradual trans-
formation of the Swedish model of social protection and employment promotion.
A right-wing government (1991–1994) embarked on a comprehensive austerity path,
not only reducing the generosity of unemployment benefits but also pushing back active
labour market policy. Whilst this appears to comply with the power resources model, it is
worth noting that social democracy largely supported retrenchment by the political right
and continued with austerity when returning to power in the mid-1990s. We thus
observe the programmatic differences between the political left and right declining,
with far-reaching implications for the development of Swedish social and labour market
policy in the 1990s and 2000s (Anderson, 2001; Sjöberg, 2011). Not only did Sweden give
up its exceptionally generous unemployment protection by international standards, it
also no longer provides great efforts to improve the employability of the unemployed
through training measures. Whilst the Great Recession resulted in unemployment that
was very similar to the economic crisis in the early 1990s, spending for training pro-
grammes dropped from 1% to 0.1% of GDP (Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017b).
Apparently, policy-makers across the political spectrum, including social democracy, have
lost faith in active labour market policy, and no longer consider it a worthwhile social
investment in the unemployed (Lindvall, 2010). Explaining the critical policy turn-around
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of social democracy, it has been highlighted that Swedish employers adopted an increasingly
‘Thatcherite’ political orientation, and they mobilised proactively for neoliberal reform in
social and labour market policy. This had a huge impact on senior social-democratic policy-
makers and their perception of the feasibility of the traditional Swedish model in a globalised
world (Ryner, 2004). Thus, with employers taking an “aggressive neoliberal posture” (Huber
& Stephens, 2001: 241; see also Kinderman, 2017), one can no longer assume the cross-class
coalition that previously supported inclusive labour market and social protection policies.
Instead, we find organised business at the ‘heart’ of the rolling back of both social protection
and investments in the unemployed, which signals the erosion of social solidarity in ‘social-
democratic’ Sweden (Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017b).
Germany: social democrats failing to make a social-democratic turn in labour
market policy
Unlike the ‘historical’ Swedish approach of investing in training to improve the employability
of the unemployed, traditional German labour market policy has been described of a strategy
of ‘welfare without work’, which made extensive use of early retirement to cope with
unemployment, in addition to temporarily ‘parking’ the unemployed in ‘cheap’ job creation
schemes to keep unemployment figures down rather than expensive training programmes.
Despite generous early retirement schemes, those at the margins of the labour market in
particular experienced successive cuts in unemployment protection (that is, retrenchment in
unemployment and social assistance), whereas unemployment benefits remained largely
untouched during the centre-right governments of the 1980s and 1990s. Critically, not
only trade unions but also employers are widely seen as supporting this approach of ‘welfare
without work’, as publicly subsidised early retirement schemes allowed them to externalise
the costs of corporate restructuring, which typically involved considerable labour productiv-
ity gains (Manow & Seils, 2000; Thelen, 2000).
As with family policy, the election of the centre-left government in 1998 provided
a window of opportunity for a ‘social-democratic turn’ in labour market policy, in
particular since social democracy in opposition heavily criticised workfare policies by
the centre-right coalition of Christian democrats and liberals. Furthermore, not only did
the Third Way ‘preach’ social investments (Giddens, 1998), but also social-democratic
labour market policy-makers and ‘their’ civil servants in the ministry of labour were keen
to embark upon ambitious labour market policies that broke with the workfare approach
of the previous government. However, any serious attempt to strengthen training policy
for ‘social-democratic’ activation was effectively blocked by the ministry of finance
which, with support from the chancellery, required ‘cost-neutral’ labour market reform.
This translated into an unambitious reform agenda that made some minor improve-
ments in job placement; and it might be best described as being caught in the middle, as it
avoided further workfare but failed to invest into the skills of the unemployed. This was
not only the result of a ‘draw’ between social-democratic ‘traditionalists’ and ‘moder-
nisers’ but also the consequence of social concertation through the so-called ‘Alliance for
Jobs’, which failed to forge a consensus between business and labour. Negotiations in the
Alliance, which was a priority of the chancellor, revealed that employers (in a similar vein
as in Sweden) had broken with the previous cross-class compromise in social and labour
market policy, and rather displayed firmly neoliberal policy preferences that were
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incompatible with large parts of social democracy and trade unions. Certainly, costly
training programmes but also job-creation schemes were viewed most critically by
employers, in addition to any generous unemployment protection. Importantly, increas-
ingly aggressive neoliberal employer mobilisation not only had huge impact on Christian
democracy but also, again as in the case of Sweden, on social-democratic modernisers
(Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017b; Kinderman, 2017).
The balance between social-democratic traditionalists and modernisers, and trade
unions and employers, experienced a massive shift when, in 2002, a scandal around
manipulated placement statistics at the federal employment office discredited labour
market policy as a whole. The chancellor used this window of opportunity to install an
expert commission for the reform of labour market policy. The so-called ‘Hartz
Commission’, with members hand-picked by the chancellery, was heavily dominated by
business (with 8 out of 15 members). By contrast, the social-democratic chancellor only
appointed two trade union representatives. The work of the Hartz Commission heavily fed
into the chancellor’s Agenda 2010, which involved some serious retrenchment with the
abolition of unemployment assistance as safety net before social assistance, cutting the
maximum duration of unemployment benefit (resulting in the unemployed arriving more
quickly in social assistance), and labour market deregulation (translating into greater
irregular employment with poor social protection). Thus, not only failed social democracy
to pursue a ‘social-democratic’ activation turn in labour market policy, it also intensified
‘neoliberal’ workfare activation started by the centre-right government. We find that
employers exercised an ever greater influence on political parties that translated into
diminishing programmatic differences, whereas trade unions were successively margin-
alised in labour market policy-making (Fleckenstein, 2011a; Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017b).
Italy: unexpected training investment in temporary agency workers
The Italian welfare state is widely thought as being geared towards labour market insiders.
The by far greatest welfare efforts can be found in old-age security with not only taking
a disproportionate share of welfare spending by OECD standards but also with pension
spending geared towards labour market insiders. That is why the Italian welfare state has
been described as a ‘pension state’ (Fargion, 2009). At the same time, labour market policy is
underdeveloped, with very little spending on training measures that would improve the
employability of those at the periphery of the labour market. Also, the Italian welfare state
does not offer anymeaningful unemployment protection for labourmarket outsiders that fall
outside unemployment benefits, which require a level of social insurance contributions that is
not typically met by labour market outsiders. Historically, the insider-oriented Italian welfare
state was built by Christian democrats, but it received political support from organised
labour. Trade unions put a strong focus on improving the working and pay conditions of
their members in highly regulated insider employment, whilst largely ignoring public social
policies as a source for material well-being – with the exception of old-age security.
Admittedly, trade unions expressed the objective of standard employment for everybody –
but, in practice, concentrating on workplace issues, labour market regulation and old-age
security resulted in heavily insider-oriented trade union strategies, which achieved little for
those at the margins of the labour market (Ferrera, 1996; Jessoula, Graziano, & Madama,
2010; Regini and Esping-Andersen 1980). Hence, despite Italian trade unions’ historical class
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identity (Hyman, 2001), their actual industrial and public policy strategies correspond well
with insider/outsider theory (Rueda, 2005) rather than the class-analytical power resources
model (Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979), as large parts of the working class were not effectively
represented by Italian trade unions.
Labour market deregulation starting in the late 1990s further polarised Italy’s deeply
dualised labour market. The rise of atypical employment, especially temporary agency
work, and an associated increase in social inequality made trade unions’ objective of
standard employment for all an ever more remote prospect. Unions recognised that
efforts to convert irregular into regular workers were no longer a viable strategy for social
inclusion. The acceptance of the changing realities in the Italian labour market translated
into a revision of trade union strategy. Following the accelerating dualisation in the
aftermath of legislation from 1997 (which, importantly, deregulated temporary agency
work), all three confederal unions created special organisations for the representation of
irregular workers. This move is seen as a genuine commitment to labour market out-
siders, in addition to a recognition that traditional union structures in Italy were
insufficient for meeting the specific needs of atypical workers. This organisational
innovation meant that temporary agency workers in Italy are fully integrated in orga-
nised labour and enjoy all statutory union rights, which is by no means common in other
European countries where workplace representation of agency workers is often compro-
mised. In terms of policy, the inclusion of these workers by Italian trade unions translated
into a major initiative for the improvement of training of these workers. Specifically,
unions pushed, in collective bargaining, for the establishment of a training body jointly
run by employers and unions to invest into the skills of temporary agency workers. The
new organisation offers basic training focussing on general skills, professional training
providing specific and technical skills, on-the-job training, and continuous training. Of
the four types of training, most resources are assigned to professional training that equip
temporary agency workers with skills of immediate use in the workplace. This initiative
allowed remarkable access to training for atypical workers, with more than one third of
temporary agency workers participating in training measures according to a European
survey. This put Italy at the top of the league table, followed by the Netherlands where
less than one fifth of temporary agency workers had access to training; and comparing
training expenditure in Italy and the Netherlands, Italian temporary agency workers
receive nearly three times the investment of their Dutch counterparts (Durazzi, 2017;
Durazzi, Fleckenstein, & Lee, 2018).
The ‘deviant case’ of Italy offers some interesting insights. A laggard in training policy, as
far as public policy is concerned, develops a rather unexpected innovation in the industrial
relations domain with the establishment of a training fund for agency workers. Whilst
organised labour in Germany and Sweden experienced increasing marginalisation, Italian
unions ‘bucked the trend’ and successfully pushed employers into filling a ‘vacuum’ in the
Italian welfare state (see also Johnston, Kornelakis, and d’Acri 2011). The mobilisation for
training was followed by campaigning for income protection for labour market outsiders.
Together with civil society organisations, unions formed the ‘Alliance against Poverty’,
which campaigned, with success, for means-tested, non-contributory income protection.
Parliament, in 2017, decided to introduce a ‘social inclusion income’, filling a serious gap in
Italian social protection. The change in trade union strategies in the face of greater labour
market dualisation and social polarisation – that is, investing into the skills of labourmarket
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outsiders, and also providing them with better social protection – shows that insider-
oriented trade unions have the capacity to develop a wider notion of social solidarity,
challenging insider/outsider theory (Durazzi et al., 2018).
Conclusions
Social investments in the domain of the family largely follow an activation trajectory of
empowerment with supporting work/family reconciliation, which was particularly aimed
at increasing women’s employment participation. This presents a remarkable social
innovation in historically conservative countries, such as Germany and Korea, where
a predominant male breadwinner ideology assigned home-making rather than employ-
ment to women. By contrast, one does not find a similar social investment turn in labour
market policy, where investment in training could have provided similar empowerment
by improving the prospect of ‘good jobs’ for those at the margins of the labour market.
Instead, labour market reform was primarily characterised by retrenchment of unem-
ployment protection and workfare activation.
In family policy, electoral competition has been identified as the ‘road’ towards greater
social investment and empowerment. Responding to changes in the electorate, both the
political left and right in Germany and Korea perceived the political imperative to modernise
family policy, creating a broad political support for a social investment turn in family policy. In
the German case, we also found organised business recognising the benefits of employment-
oriented family policy reform, which allowed the forming of an even broader political
coalition. We do not find similar business support in Korea, but employers at least gave up
their initial opposition in the face of rising political pressure. Without these political under-
pinnings, as in the case of Japan, our findings suggest that ‘progressive’ family policy reform is
not sustainable. Like Germany and Korea, Japan was confronted with great pressures to
increase fertility. Whilst this allowed the country to ‘pioneer’ childcare among latecomer
countries, the absence of electoral competition (due to Japanese people’s more conservative
value and policy orientation) did not allow the consolidation of progressive reform; and
instead the country returned to more traditional general family support policy with the
increasing of child benefits, even though policy experts in the Japanese bureaucracy (typically
perceived as being rather powerful in policy-making) doubt these will allow the reversing of
Japan’s fertility decline. This comparison shows that ‘functional’ pressures, such as fertility
decline and societal ageing (these are present in all three countries), are not sufficient to ‘pave
the road’ towards greater social investment, but that politics remains the main ‘driver’ of
welfare reform; and the more conservative orientation in Japanese welfare politics (with its
foundation in a more conservative society) drove corresponding family policies (that is, child
benefits rather than childcare expansion). We note though that the current Japanese prime
minister, from the conservative LDP, pledged amajor childcare initiative, including some free
public childcare provision, the subsidisation of private childcare provision and the elimination
of waiting lists by 2020, to help with women’s work/family reconciliation in the face of the
country’s demographic challenges (Japanese Cabinet Office, 2017). Yet, it remains to be seen
whether this childcare initiative materialises, as previous Japanese prime ministers struggled
with childcare reform.
By contrast, in labourmarket policy, broad political support for unemployment protection
and training collapsed in Sweden, with employers successfully mobilising against social-
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democratic labour market policy. Also, in Germany, we find business displaying increasingly
liberal policy preferences in labour market reform; and corresponding political mobilisation
can be observed. Whilst we might not be surprised that the political right responded to
pressure from business, conventional wisdomwould have expected the left to resist employer
mobilisation. However, social democrats in both Sweden and Germany moved towards the
political centre – not only by supporting retrenchment in unemployment protection but also
turning away from training as social investment in the employability of the unemployed. The
Swedish andGerman experiences suggest that the lack of employer support presents a ‘barrier’
to social investment in the unemployed regardless of government composition. This observa-
tion is supported by the ‘deviant’ experience of Italy, where trade unions were successful in
overcoming employer resistance. Italy certainly still presents a ‘laggard’ in public training
policy, but organised labour, using the industrial relations arena, partially filled this vacuum
for temporary agency workers. Apparently, consensus between trade unions and employers
(admittedly with Italian labour pushing ‘hard’) still presents a ‘road’ to social investments for
those at themargins of the labourmarket. Thefinding that unions can stillmake a difference is
also confirmed in recent German/Austrian comparison by Durazzi andGeyer (forthcoming),
who show that Austrian unions, with high institutional resources and favourable legacy
though, played a key role in creating inclusive training systems for labour market outsiders.
Without effective union mobilisation, as in Sweden and Germany, employer resistance
presents a very high ‘barrier’ to social investments improving the employability of labour
market outsiders.
To conclude, political parties can be considered to sit in the ‘driving seat’ in family
policy reform that brought considerable social investments driven by electoral impera-
tives; and without these imperatives ‘empowering’ family policy reform does not appear
politically sustainable. Critically, the ‘modernisation’ of family policy appears possible
under the leadership of both the political left and right. Conventionally, political parties
of the left are associated with empowering family policy reform, whereas conservative
parties are not thought to pursue reforms that invest into the employment promotion of
mothers. In other words, whilst our findings support approaches emphasising party
political agency in welfare reform, we question the idea of significant partisan difference
in family policy reform. Not only do we find ‘unexpected’ investments in families in the
conservative latecomer countries of Germany and Korea (also challenging path depen-
dence theory; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000), but also that these investments ‘acceler-
ated’ under conservative leaderships. The German and Korean experiences thus indicate
a responsiveness of political parties to societal changes, while the Japanese case tells us,
without wider societal support, transforming the policies that reinforce the gendered
division of labour is incredibly difficult, despite enormous pressures from fertility decline
and societal ageing. Turning to labour market reform, employers – and trade unions in
the ‘deviant cases’ – appear as critical agency rather than political parties. We suggest that
the traditional prominence of social partners in labour market policy-making remains
largely intact, though with the power balance having shifted towards business. In this new
environment, the reach of political parties seems increasingly limited, and we observe the
differences between the political left and right diminishing. But unlike family policy
reform where the right moves towards the left, we find the left moving towards the right
in labour market reform. Apparently, left parties do no longer typically appear to make
the difference they used to make in welfare state-building. Instead of providing greater
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opportunity, ‘condemning’ labour market reforms have contributed rising social inequal-
ity, raising the issue of political parties’ reform capacity in the age of dualisation. The
differences we observe in the political dynamics behind family policy and labour market
reform point to varieties of social investment politics, rather than ‘a politics of social
investments’. In the social investment literature, varieties in the political drivers behind
different social investment policies have not received due attention; and future research
would benefit from examining additional social investment policy domains in order to
systematically theorise the varieties of social investment politics.
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